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Abstract
We consider an economy where a finite set of agents can trade on one
of two asset markets. Due to endogenous participation the markets may
differ in the liquidity they provide. Traders have idiosyncratic preferences
for the markets, e.g. due to differential time preferences for maturity dates
of futures contracts. For a broad range of parameters we find that no
trade, trade on both markets (individualization) as well as trade on one
market only (standardization) is supported by a Nash equilibrium. By
contrast, whenever the number of traders becomes large, the evolutionary
process selects a unique stochastically stable state which corresponds to
the equilibrium with two active markets and coincides with the welfare
maximizing market structure.
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1 Introduction
In standard general equilibrium models without trading frictions, all agents can
simultaneously trade on all existing market places. In reality, however, it can
commonly be observed that agents need to make choices about particular markets
they participate in. In the context of financial markets, prominent examples for
this kind of decision problem are the choice of an exchange by a broker and by a
company issuing shares, or the selection of a set of funds or single assets by an
investor.
To analyze the implications of such a situation, this paper studies a simple
model with two markets located at the endpoints of an interval, where identical
assets can be traded. These markets may differ in two respects. Firstly, given
their mean-variance preferences, the traders prefer a liquid market over an illiquid
one since it guarantees better predictable price realizations for the assets.1 In our
model the liquidity of a market increases with the number of traders and hence
is endogenous. Whether one market is perceived to be more attractive than the
other then depends on the relative size of these markets. Secondly, each trader has
an individual preference for one of the two markets. We model this preference
by a simple linear cost schedule and assume that traders are sitting at equal
distance from each other between the two markets. Hence, agents face a trade-off
between the expected liquidity of a market and its characteristics with respect
to idiosyncratic preferences. The cost can be given several interpretations, e.g. it
may reflect the traders’ time preference when the interval represents all possible
maturity dates of futures contracts and the positions of the markets represent
the tradable maturity dates (see Economides and Siow, 1988). Or the cost may
reflect a trader’s preference or cost of adaption for different information systems
or trading platforms used by the exchanges.
As a benchmark case we first study the situation where agents correctly antic-
ipate the liquidity on the two markets. It turns out that a (static) pure strategy
Nash equilibrium always exists, but that there may be multiple equilibria includ-
ing an implausible no trade equilibrium. In particular, there are ranges of the
parameter values for this model for which both the situation where all traders
1See O’Hara (1995) for a discussion of the role of liquidity in financial markets.
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meet on one of the two markets (standardization) and the situation where each
market is actively used (individualization) coexist as Nash equilibria. This coex-
istence of equilibria is robust against an increase in the number of traders. By
contrast, individualization is the unique welfare maximizing market structure if
the number of traders becomes large.
Apart from the multiplicity of equilibria, the static model fails to capture an
important element of market selection, especially in the dynamic environment of
modern financial markets: Rather than being a one-shot decision, market selec-
tion can be regularly revised by market participants based upon the experiences
they have made in previous trading periods. Therefore, the paper investigates a
dynamic, evolutionary model in which traders are not assumed to have rational
expectations about the liquidity on different markets. Instead, the model assumes
that agents interact repeatedly and form their expectations on the basis of the
observed market liquidity in the past. This gives rise to an evolutionary process,
where in each period agents play a best reply to a sample of observations made
in the past and where they occasionally make a mistake. For this adaptive-play-
dynamic (Young, 1993) we determine the stochastically stable states, i.e. those
states in which the evolutionary process spends most of its time as the error rate
goes to zero. We find that there are two critical values for the exogenous costs,
such that for costs below the lower value all agents meet on a single market most
of the time, while for costs above the upper value both markets remain active.
Hence, liquidity considerations lead to a standardization of markets if and only
if individual preferences (i.e. the costs in our model) are sufficiently immaterial.
In case the two critical values do not coincide, there is a nondegenerate interval
of costs for which both, standardization and individualization, are stochastically
stable. Different from the static fully rational case, however, this indeterminacy
vanishes if the number of traders becomes large. The evolutionary approach pre-
dicts that only the situation with two markets will survive in the long run, if
the number of traders approaches infinity. Hence, it is the welfare maximizing
market structure that is selected for. Moreover, the speed of convergence to the
stable market structure is reasonably fast, implying that the evolutionary forces
are already effective in the medium run.
The model analyzed in this paper relates to several strands of the literature.
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It builds on the literature on the selection of markets in the presence of liquidity
effects. Important contributions in this field are due to Pagano (1989a, 1989b),
and to Economides and Siow (1988). The latter authors, for example, study
market selection in a static framework where, as in our model, multiple equilibria
with ambiguous welfare properties arise. Our paper goes a step further by ana-
lyzing the stability properties of the different equilibria. Similar models are also
studied in political economics, where, for example, Alesina and Spolaore (1997)
investigate the endogenous determination of the number and size of nations. The
model presented in this paper extends this strand of the literature by studying the
issue of market selection within an evolutionary framework. Moreover, our paper
adds to the recent literature on endogenous participation in financial markets
(see Bettzu¨ge and Hens, 2001, and chapter 1 in Gu¨th and Ludwig, 2000). While
we study the evolution of market participation in general, i.e. the choice between
different asset markets, these papers concentrate on the evolution of single assets
on one market. Hence, our results complement theirs and there are interesting
parallels: Bettzu¨ge and Hens (2001) find that incomplete financial markets can
be a persistent phenomenon. In Gu¨th and Ludwig (2000) it is shown that there
exist stable situations where traders, who are restricted in the number of assets
they can trade, do not necessarily exhaust these trading restrictions. By com-
parison our results show that the existence of two markets need not be a stable
situation, if the number of traders is small. Another related paper is Alo´s-Ferrer
and Kirchsteiger (2003) who study the evolution of a market clearing institution
vs. non-market clearing institutions. They find that the market clearing institu-
tion is always stable but that other, non-market clearing institutions can survive
in the long run as well.
Finally, our model can be seen as a specific instance of the large and grow-
ing literature on evolutionary equilibrium and disequilibrium selection.2 Like the
seminal papers by Foster and Young (1990), Kandori et al. (1993) and Young
(1993) we study an evolutionary process in an economy that is subject to small
but persistent random shocks. While having some limitations with respect to the
robustness of its predictions3 the concept of a best-reply dynamic and of stochas-
2For an overview see, for example, Samuelson (1997) and Young (1998).
3For a critical discussion see for example Bergin and Lipman (1996).
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tically stable equilibria is one of the most prominent approaches suggested within
evolutionary game theory. Our paper exemplifies the power of this approach for
the specific game we are studying.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the static model
and derive the set of Nash equilibria. In section 3 we present the evolutionary
approach. We solve for the stochastic stable states and compare them to the
welfare maximizing market structures. Finally, in section 4 we conclude. All
proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Static Economy
There are I agents in our economy (I ≥ 4) who are located at equal distance
from each other in an interval that we normalize to [0, 1], i.e. agent i, i = 1, . . . , I,
is located at (i− 1)/(I − 1). For simplicity we only consider the case where I is
even. With a slight abuse of notation by I we also denote the set of agents in our
economy. There are 2 assets, one safe and one risky asset. The safe asset gives
a riskless return of R while the risky asset pays a random dividend d with mean
µ and variance σ2. Every agent is endowed with θ¯i = θ¯ + ei shares of the risky
asset, where θ¯ is a constant and the ei are i.i.d. disturbances with mean 0 and
variance σ2e . Also, each agent is endowed with ω¯ units of the safe asset.
There are two markets where these assets can be traded. Market 1 is located
at 0 and market 2 is located at 1. When trading on market k (k = 1, 2) agent
i determines her demand θi(q) for the risky asset such as to maximize a mean-
variance utility function, taking the price q of the risky asset as given (the price
of the safe asset is normalized to 1). More specifically, agent i solves the following
optimization problem
max u(xi) = E(xi)− γ
2
Var(xi)
(P i)
s.t. xi = θid + R
(
ω¯ + q(θ¯i − θi)) for some θi ∈ R,
where γ > 0 is a measure of the agents’ risk aversion, and E(·) and Var(·) denote
expectation and variance, respectively.
Agents also have idiosyncratic preferences for the two markets which we model
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by a linear cost c > 0. Trader i’s disutility ci(k) for trading on market k (k = 1, 2)
is given by c times her distance to the market. Hence,
ci(k) = c
∣∣∣∣ i− 1I − 1 − (k − 1)
∣∣∣∣ .
We assume that agent i’s overall utility from trade is additively separable in the
linear cost, i.e. if xi is her final wealth obtained from trade on market k, then her
utility is
u(xi)− ci(k).4
The sequencing of events and actions in our model is the following (see
Figure 1). First, each agent either goes to a market or stays at her position
on the line. Then, each agent observes the realization of her endowment, but
not the endowments of other agents. An agent who did not go to any of the two
markets receives the utility from consuming her endowment. Agents who went
to one of the two markets trade assets with other agents on the same market and
receive the utility from terminal wealth after trade minus the cost they bear.
Time
Asset trade
!
Traders
choose
market
or stay at
home
Realization
of
endowments
Realization of
dividends
and
consumption
" "" "
Figure 1: Timing of events and actions.
Observe that the timing is such that agents have to choose a market before
knowing their endowments.5 What we have in mind are, for example, institutional
4Alternatively, we can think of the disutility ci(k) as a monetary cost which reduces the final
wealth from trade xi. In this case, i’s utility from trade on market k is given by u(xi− ci(k)) =
u(xi)− ci(k) for the particular mean-variance utility function we assume.
5See Pagano (1989b) for a model where actions are taken after the realization of endowments.
5
investors who have to choose a market on behalf of customers whose endowments
they do not know yet.6 Moreover, we do not allow agents to simultaneously
trade on both markets, in other words the traders cannot arbitrage between the
markets. This imposes no restriction if, as in one interpretation of our model, the
positions of the markets represent different maturity dates for futures contracts
and the positions of the traders represent their most preferred maturity dates. In
this case arbitrage between the markets is ruled out by physical restrictions and
due to the disutility of trade they face, agents will trade on one market only.
We solve the model backwards and first determine an equilibrium on any of
the two asset markets taking market participation as given.
2.1 Equilibrium on the Asset Market
Agent i’s optimization problem (P i) can be rewritten as7
(P˜ i) max
θi
µθi + R
(
ω¯ + q(θ¯ + ei − θi))− γ
2
σ2(θi)2.
From the first order condition, which is necessary and sufficient for a solution
θi(q) of (P˜ i), we obtain
θi(q) =
µ− qR
γσ2
.
Let T be the set of agents trading on a market. Then, an equilibrium price q∗ is
determined by ∑
i∈T
θi(q∗) =
∑
i∈T
θ¯i.
Hence,
q∗ =
1
R
(
µ− γσ2 (θ¯ + e¯T )) ,
where e¯T =
1
|T |
∑
i∈T e
i. Since the ei are i.i.d., q∗ is a random variable which
depends on the number of agents participating in the market, |T |, but not on
their identity. It follows that
θi(q∗) = θ¯ + e¯T .
6For example, brokers buying a seat in an exchange.
7Observe that trader i knows her endowment θ¯i when determining her demand for the risky
asset.
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If we do not take into account the idiosyncratic preferences for trade, then agent
i’s ex post utility after trading on the market is given by
U˜ i(q∗, ei) = µ(θ¯ + e¯T ) + Rω¯ +
(
µ− γσ2(θ¯ + e¯T )
)
(ei − e¯T )− γ
2
σ2(θ¯ + e¯T )
2,
and her ex ante utility (prior to knowing her endowment and the endowments of
other agents) is
U(T ) = U i(T ) := E
(
U˜ i(q∗, ei)
)
= µθ¯ + Rω¯ − γ
2
σ2θ¯2 − γ
2|T |σ
2σ2e ,
where we have used the fact that E(ei) = E(e¯T ) = E (e¯T (ei − e¯T )) = 0 and
E(e¯2T ) = σ2e/|T |. If we define U0 to be the utility from not trading on any of the
two markets (i.e. trading on a market with |T | = 1), hence
U0 = µθ¯ + Rω¯ − γ
2
σ2(θ¯2 + σ2e),
then
U(T ) = U0 + K
( |T |− 1
|T |
)
,
where K is the constant defined by K = γσ2σ2e/2. Observe that U is strictly
increasing and strictly concave in |T |. Let Tk be the set of agents trading on
market k, k = 1, 2. Then, taking into account the idiosyncratic preferences, i’s
ex ante utility for trading on market k with a set of traders Tk is given by
U(Tk)− ci(k).
Next we determine the participation at the two markets.
2.2 Market Participation
In our economy each trader has three options: she can trade on market 1 or on
market 2 or she can stay at home and consume her endowments. In the following
we will study the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria for the resulting strategic
game. To this end we first formulate our economic model in game theoretic terms.
Let I be the set of players and let Si ≡ S = {0, 1, 2} be the strategy set for
player i, where 0 means that player i does not trade and k means that i trades
on market k, k = 1, 2. For a strategy profile s ∈ ∏i∈I Si let Tk(s) = {i | si = k}
7
be the set of players trading on market k, k = 1, 2, at the strategy profile s. For
any i ∈ I trader i’s utility at the strategy profile s is given by
ui(s) =
{
U0 , if si = 0
U(Tk(s))− ci(k) , if si = k ∈ {1, 2}
.
Then Γ = (I, (Si)i∈I , (ui)i∈I) is a standard finite I-person normal form game.
In the following we will characterize the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria. A
strategy profile s∗ is a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium of Γ, if ui(s∗) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i)
for all si ∈ Si and all i ∈ I.8
The definition of a Nash equilibrium assumes that agents correctly anticipate
their own liquidity effect on a market. This, together with our assumption of
price taking behavior on the asset market, introduces an element of bounded
rationality on the part of traders. Agents who are aware of their influence on
the market size may also be aware of their strategic influence on asset prices.
However, a strategic manipulation of asset prices requires knowledge of the price
mechanism and hence of other traders’ preferences and endowments. At least
traders would need to know the distribution of the other agents’ characteristics.
It seems safe to assume that, in general, they do not have this information in
real financial markets.9 Hence, we model agents as price takers when they trade
on an asset market. Observe that the only rationality requirement then is that
agents maximize their utility for given and observed asset prices. They do not
have to form rational expectations about future asset prices, since this is a one-
period model with short-lived assets and, as usual, our model is silent about
how asset prices adjust such as to clear the market. The same is true for the
dynamic, evolutionary model we study in the following section, which consists of a
sequence of static economies with short-lived assets and no capital accumulation.
Even if traders do not know the price mechanism and act as price takers, it seems
natural to assume that by frequent trading they have learned how the market size
influences price volatility and hence ex ante utility. Agents then select the best
8If s ∈∏i∈I Si is a strategy profile, then by s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sI) we denote the
strategy profile for trader i’s opponents (with the obvious adjustment whenever i = 1 or i = I).
9Even if a trader would have this information, she may perceive a proper strategic analysis
as too complex.
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market given their expectation about the market participation of other traders.
In a Nash equilibrium it is assumed that these expectations are correct. As we
have argued in the introduction, this rationality assumption may not be realistic
and we will abandon it in our evolutionary approach, where we assume that
agents play a best reply to simple adaptive expectations.
One immediately verifies that there always exists a trivial Nash equilibrium
where there is no trade: If all traders expect everyone to stay at home, then
staying at home is indeed a best reply. We will see that the no trade equilibrium
is not the only Nash equilibrium that can arise. There can be additional equi-
libria, one with trade on both markets, where traders split equally among the
markets (individualization), and one, where everyone trades on the same mar-
ket (standardization). Since our aim is to study the trade off between liquidity
considerations and costs we restrict our analysis to the set of costs for which stan-
dardization is strictly individually rational for all traders. Therefore, we make
the following assumption, which implies that U(I)− ci(k) > U0 for all i ∈ I and
k = 1, 2:
Assumption c < K(I − 1)/I.
Consider the following strategy profiles:
s∗0 with s∗0i = 0 for all i ∈ I,
s∗1 with s∗1i = 1 for all i ∈ I,
s∗2 with s∗2i = 2 for all i ∈ I,
s∗3 with s∗3i =
{
1 , if i ≤ I/2
2 , if i ≥ I/2 + 1 .
The following theorem provides a complete characterization of the set of pure
strategy Nash equilibria.
Theorem 2.1 1. If c <
4K(I − 1)
I(I + 2)
, then the set of Nash equilibria is given
by {s∗0, s∗1, s∗2}. s∗1 and s∗2 are strict Nash equilibria, while s∗0 is non
strict.
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2. If c ≥ 4K(I − 1)
I(I + 2)
, then the set of Nash equilibria is given by {s∗0, s∗1, s∗2, s∗3}.
Again, s∗1 and s∗2 are strict Nash equilibria, while s∗0 is non strict. s∗3 is
a strict Nash equilibrium if and only if c >
4K(I − 1)
I(I + 2)
.
As we see there is always a no trade equilibrium but there is also a broad
range of costs for which trade on both markets as well as trade on one market
only is supported by a Nash equilibrium. Only for small c trade on both markets
is not supported as an equilibrium. Observe that the coexistence of equilibria
corresponding to standardization and individualization is robust against an in-
crease in the number of traders: The interval for which these equilibria do not
coexist becomes vanishingly small if I → ∞. Hence, the Nash equilibrium con-
cept does not have much predictive power concerning the number of markets
in our economy. Intuitively, we may expect individualization to be more stable
than standardization if the number of traders is large. In this case the liquid-
ity gain from standardization is small relative to its cost so that it should be
more difficult to destabilize the individualization equilibrium than to destabilize
the standardization equilibrium. Section 3 will provide an evolutionary analysis
which confirms this intuition.
2.3 Welfare Analysis
Before we proceed with our evolutionary approach we analyze our economy
from a welfare theoretic point of view. We again restrict to the case where
c < K(I − 1)/I. Obviously, the Nash equilibria of the game cannot be Pareto
ranked since there is always an agent who strictly gains and another one who
strictly loses when switching from one equilibrium to another. However, we can
analyze which market structure would be chosen by a social planner who aims at
maximizing a purely utilitarian social welfare function. Since any utility profile
corresponds to a particular strategy profile chosen by the agents, the planner’s
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problem is given by10
max
s∈∏i∈I Si W (s) =
∑
i∈I
ui(s).
A straightforward computation shows that sˆ is a welfare maximizing strategy
profile if and only if
sˆ ∈

{s∗1, s∗2} , if c < 4K(I − 1)/I2
{s∗3} , if c > 4K(I − 1)/I2
{s∗1, s∗2, s∗3} , if c = 4K(I − 1)/I2
.
Thus, for small c standardization is welfare maximizing, while for c large
individualization maximizes social welfare. Moreover, for all c individualization
is welfare maximizing if the number of traders is sufficiently large. This follows
from the fact that in a large economy the utility gain from merging two large
markets is small relative to the increase in individual costs, so that the welfare
maximizing market structure is the one that minimizes costs. Observe that a
welfare maximizing strategy profile is always a Nash equilibrium of the game for
the range of costs we are considering, but the converse is obviously false.
3 An Evolutionary Approach
We now consider a dynamic version of the static economy analyzed in the last
section. Assume that there is a sequence of static economies, which we index
by t = 1, 2, . . ., i.e. the game Γ is played repeatedly and in each period t the
agents have to decide on which market to trade. Since trade on the markets is
anonymous, there are no reputation effects and traders can base their decision on
which market to trade only on the observation of the attendance at both markets
in previous periods. We assume that traders have to consume all they possess
after each trading round so that there is no capital accumulation. Alternatively,
we may think of a scenario, where after each trading round all traders die and
are replaced by new traders with the same characteristics. Also, assets are short-
10Observe that it is justified to add up the utilities of all traders in order to determine the
welfare maximum since utility is transferable due to the additive separability of costs.
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lived, i.e. they exist only for one period and then are replaced by new assets with
the same characteristics.
We will assume that traders, instead of having rational expectations about
the participation at the two markets, behave adaptively and play a best reply to
what they have observed in the past. Thus, as mentioned before, the rather strong
rationality assumption, namely that traders correctly anticipate the size of the
two markets, is abandoned in the evolutionary model.11 Traders have a limited
capacity to process information, or alternatively, gathering information about
the previous attendance at the two markets is time consuming and hence costly.
Information about the number of traders at both markets is only available for
the last m ≥ 1 periods and each trader can process the information of at most
n ≤ m periods, where n ≥ 1. Later we will place an upper bound on n/m.
Since the memory m is finite, in contrast to fictitious play the past is eventually
forgotten and does not influence the traders’ decision in the presence any more.
In this setting, we will then assume that traders occasionally make mistakes or
experiment, i.e. with some small probability they do not choose a best reply to
the observed market participation in the past. The question is, which market
structure will most likely be observed in the long run if the error probability goes
to zero. Will it be the no trade equilibrium s∗0 or standardization (s∗1 or s∗2)
or individualization (s∗3), or will we rather observe some form of disequilibrium
behavior? We analyze this question by appealing to the notion of stochastic
stability introduced by Foster and Young (1990).
We will now describe the adaptive play process in more detail. Let H be the
set of all histories of length m, i.e. h ∈ H if there exist strategy profiles s1, . . . , sm,
in
∏
i∈I Si such that h = (s
1, . . . , sm). The set H is the state space on which we
will define the evolutionary dynamics. A state h′ ∈ H is a successor of h ∈ H
if h′ is obtained from h by deleting the left-most element of h and adding a new
right-most element. Given some history h = (s1, . . . , sm) ∈ H, si ∈ Si is a best
11For a discussion of the behavioral assumptions and, in particular, the rationality require-
ments in our model we refer the reader to the comments after the definition of a Nash equilibrium
in Section 2.2.
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reply of agent i to a sample (sr1 , . . . , srn) from h if
1
n
n∑
l=1
ui(si, s
rl
−i) ≥
1
n
n∑
l=1
ui(s
′
i, s
rl
−i) for all s
′
i ∈ Si. (1)
Hence, si is a best reply to the joint empirical distribution of the other players’
actions in the sample. Observe that in order to determine a best reply in the
sense of (1) a trader does not need to know the actions of the other traders in the
sampled periods. Instead she only needs information about the attendance at the
two markets in the sampled periods and in addition she has to recall whether and
if so on which market she traded in these periods. The reader may have noticed
that we deviate from the standard definition of a best reply to a sample, where
agents are assumed to play a best reply to the product of other players’ empirical
distribution of play. By contrast we require traders to play a best reply to the
joint empirical distribution of play, since this is the only variable they observe.
With these preparations we can define a Markov process on H as follows. For
h ∈ H and si ∈ Si let pi(si|h) be the probability that i chooses si given the
history h. We require that pi(·|h) is a best reply distribution, i.e. pi(si|h) > 0
if and only if there exists a sample of size n from h to which si is a best reply.
Also we require pi(·|h) to be independent of the trading period t. Traders choose
their best replies independently of each other, i.e. if s = (si)i∈I is the right-most
element of h′ ∈ H, the probability of moving from h ∈ H to h′ ∈ H is given by
P 0hh′ =
{ ∏
i∈I pi(si|h) , if h′ is a successor of h
0 , else
.
The process P 0 is called adaptive play with memory m and sample size n. For-
mally, we assume that actions in the first m trading periods are randomly selected
so that the sampling process starts in period t = m + 1.
A state is absorbing if it constitutes a singleton recurrent class. An absorbing
state will be called a convention. Obviously, h is a convention if and only if it
consists of a strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium played m times in a row. In
general, adaptive play does not converge to a convention. It does so, however, for
weakly acyclic games (to be defined below), if sampling is sufficiently incomplete
(Young, 1993). In order to determine the bound on the number of sampled
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periods, we first define the best reply graph of a game Γ as follows: Any vertex
in the best reply graph is given by a strategy profile s ∈ ∏i∈I Si, and there is
a directed edge s → s′ between two vertices s and s′ if and only if s )= s′ and
there exists a unique player i such that s′−i = s−i and s
′
i is a best reply to s−i.
The game Γ is weakly acyclic, if from any strategy profile there exists a directed
path in the best reply graph of Γ to some strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium
of Γ. For any strategy profile s ∈ ∏i∈I Si, let L(s) be the length of the shortest
directed path in the best reply graph from s to a strict Nash equilibrium and
define L = maxs L(s). Then, for our game we have the following result:
Theorem 3.1 Let n ≤ m/(L + 2). Then, adaptive play converges almost surely
to a convention.
For the convergence result it is crucial that sampling is sufficiently incomplete
since this creates enough stochastic variability in order to prevent the process from
getting stuck in cycles. The following example shows that adaptive play may fail
to converge, if the condition in Theorem 3.1 is not satisfied.
Example 3.1 Let I = 10, K = 1, c = 9/29 and let m = n = 1. Consider the
following strategy profiles s and s′ with
si =
{
1 , if i ≤ 4
2 , if i ≥ 5 and s
′
i =
{
1 , if i ≤ 3 or i = 5
2 , if i ≥ 6 or i = 4 .
Then adaptive play exhibits the cycle s→ s′ → s, more precisely P 0ss′ = P 0s′s = 1.
From Theorem 3.1 it immediately follows that adaptive play almost surely
converges to the convention corresponding to standardization if c ≤ 4K(I − 1)
I(I + 2)
,
since standardization is the unique strict Nash equilibrium in this case. However,
if c >
4K(I − 1)
I(I + 2)
, then individualization and standardization are both strict Nash
equilibria and convergence may depend on initial conditions. In order to analyze
whether in this case convergence to standardization or to individualization is
most likely to be observed, we now consider perturbations of the adaptive play
process caused by the fact that traders do not always choose a best reply to
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their observations but occasionally make mistakes or experiment with nonoptimal
strategies.
We assume that in each period there is a positive probability ε that trader
i does not play a best reply to some sample of size n but randomly chooses a
strategy from Si. Experimentation is independent across traders and independent
of the time period t. By qi(si|h) we denote the probability that i chooses si ∈ Si
given that i experiments and the history is h. We assume that qi(si|h) > 0 for
all si ∈ Si and all h ∈ H and that
∑
si∈Si qi(si|h) = 1. The perturbed process
P ε is defined as follows. Let J ⊂ I be the set of players that experiments.
Then, conditionally on the event that the traders in J experiment, the transition
probability for moving from h ∈ H to h′ ∈ H is
QJhh′ =
{ ∏
j∈J qj(sj|h)
∏
j /∈J pj(sj|h) , if h′ is a successor of h
0 , else
,
where s ∈ ∏i∈I Si is the right-most element of h′. Hence, the new transition
probability for moving from h ∈ H to h′ ∈ H becomes
P εhh′ = (1− ε)IP 0hh′ +
∑
J⊂I,J &=∅
ε|J |(1− ε)|I\J |QJhh′ .
The process P ε is called adaptive play with memory m, sample size n, experimen-
tation probability ε and experimentation distributions qi. The exact specification
of the qi’s will not play a role in the following so there is no need to be more
precise. The only thing that matters is that all mistakes have positive probabil-
ity and that they are independent across traders. The process P ε is aperiodic
and irreducible for all ε > 0, where the latter implies the existence of a unique
stationary distribution µε on H satisfying µεP ε = µε. Foster and Young (1990)
introduced the following notion:
Definition 3.1 A state h ∈ H is stochastically stable relative to the process P ε
if
lim
ε→0
µεh > 0.
Hence, the stochastically stable states are those states that are most likely to be
observed in the long run when the experimentation probability becomes small.
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In order to characterize the set of stochastically stable states we need some more
definitions. A mistake in the transition h → h′ is a component si of the right-
most element s of h′ which is not a best reply by agent i to any sample of size
n from h. For h, h′ ∈ H the resistance r(h, h′) is the total number of mistakes
involved in the transition h→ h′ if h′ is a successor of h, otherwise r(h, h′) =∞.
For k = 1, 2, 3, let hk = (s∗k, . . . , s∗k) be the convention consisting of a rep-
etition of the Nash equilibrium s∗k. Intuitively, h1 and h2, i.e. the conventions
where everyone goes to the same market (standardization), are stochastically sta-
ble if and only if we need (weakly) less mistakes to go from the equilibrium with
two markets to an equilibrium with one market than we need for the opposite
direction. Similarly, h3, i.e. the convention where the first half of the agents
trades on market 1 and the second half trades on market 2 (individualization), is
stochastically stable if and only if we need (weakly) less mistakes to go from an
equilibrium with one market to the equilibrium with two markets than we need
for the opposite direction. In order to give a formal statement of this claim, let
r∗ be the minimum resistance over all paths from h1 (or h2) to h3, i.e.
r∗ = min
(h1,...,hτ )
r(h1, h2) + r(h2, h3) + . . . + r(hτ−1, hτ ),
where the minimum is taken over all directed paths (h1, . . . , hτ ) with h1 = h1
and hτ = h3. Similarly, we define r˜ to be the minimum resistance over all paths
from h3 to h1 (or h2). We then have the following result:
Lemma 3.2
h1 and h2 are stochastically stable ⇐⇒ r˜ ≤ r∗,
h3 is stochastically stable ⇐⇒ r˜ ≥ r∗.
In order to see, under which conditions it is true that r˜ > r∗, assume we are
in the convention h3, where there is trade on both markets. Then, for going from
h3 to any convention with trade on one market only, e.g. h1, we need a certain
number of traders to switch from market 2 to market 1 by mistake. This number
has to be sufficiently large, i.e. these traders have to create enough liquidity at
market 1, so that it is a best reply for the remaining players at market 2 to switch
as well. The higher the cost c, the more liquidity is needed in order to induce
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a “best reply switch” to the more distant market, i.e. r˜ is non-decreasing in c.
Conversely, assume we are in convention h1, where everyone trades on market
1. Again a certain number of traders has to switch from market 1 to market 2
by mistake in order to induce a best-reply switch to market 2 by the remaining
players, who are closer to market 2 than to market 1. The higher the cost c the
more attractive it is for a trader to go the the closest market, in which case less
traders are needed, who switch by mistake. In other words, r∗ is non-increasing
in c. Hence, if c is large, it is easier to switch from h1 or h2 to h3, and therefore h3,
the convention with trade on both markets, is stochastically stable. Conversely,
if c is small, then it is easier to switch from h3 to h1 or h2, and therefore h1
and h2, the conventions with trade on one market only, are stochastically stable.
This is the intuition for the following theorem, the formal proof of which is in the
appendix.
Theorem 3.3 Let I > 4n and n ≤ m/(L + 2). Then there exist c∗1, c∗2 ∈(
4K(I − 1)
I(I + 2)
,
K(I − 1)
I
)
, c∗1 ≤ c∗2, such that h1 and h2 are the unique stochas-
tically stable states if c < c∗1, and h3 is the unique stochastically stable state if
c > c∗2. If c
∗
1 < c
∗
2, then all states h1, h2, h3, are stochastically stable for c ∈ (c∗1, c∗2).
The coexistence of stochastically stable states in the interval (c∗1, c
∗
2) is due
to the fact that we only have a finite number of traders, which implies that the
resistances r∗ and r˜ are step functions in c. Hence, one can conjecture that
the indeterminacy vanishes if the number of traders goes to infinity, which is
confirmed by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4 For fixed n, if we write r∗, r˜, c∗1, c
∗
2, as functions of the number of
traders I, then there exists I0 = I0(c,K) such that
r∗(I) ≤ nc + K
c
for all I ≥ I0.
Moreover,
lim
I→∞
r˜(I) =∞,
and
lim
I→∞
c∗1(I) = lim
I→∞
c∗2(I) = 0.
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In order to understand the effect of an increase in the number of traders on the
robustness of the different conventions consider first the case where the economy
is in a state of standardization, where everyone trades on the same market, let’s
say on market 2. In order to trigger a transition to the convention with trade on
both markets we need a certain number of traders, F ∗, to switch to market 1 by
mistake.13 This number has to be large enough so that for the marginal trader,
who is sitting next to the “mutants”, the cost reduction from switching to market
1 is larger than the utility loss she suffers due to the decrease in liquidity. If I
goes to infinity the cost reduction converges to c, independent of the number of
mutants, while the utility loss is bounded above by a function of the number of
mutants (K/F ∗). Hence, the number of mutants necessary to equate the cost
reduction and the utility loss, i.e. to trigger a transition from standardization to
individualization is bounded (by (c + K)/c since F ∗ is an integer).
Consider now the case where the economy is in a state of individualization,
where there is trade on both markets. Again, in order to trigger a transition
to standardization, where, for example, everyone trades on market 1, we need
enough players to switch to market 1 by mistake. The number of mutants has to
be large enough so that for the marginal trader sitting next to the mutants the
utility gain due to the increase in liquidity is larger than the increase in cost for
trading on the more distant market. If I goes to infinity both the cost increase,
as well as the utility gain go to zero. The former is due to the fact that for
a fixed number of mutants the marginal trader moves closer and closer to the
trader in the middle of the market as I goes to infinity. The utility gain goes to
zero because for a fixed number of mutants the difference in liquidity at the two
markets has a negligible effect on utility, if I becomes large since marginal utility
converges to zero. Moreover, an inspection of the traders’ preferences reveals
that the utility gain goes to zero at a higher rate (O(I−2)) than the increase in
cost (O(I−1)), i.e. liquidity considerations become relatively unimportant com-
pared to costs. Hence, in order to trigger a transition from individualization to
12 Observe that we cannot fix both n and m and let I →∞ since L depends on I. From the
proof of Theorem 3.1 it follows that L ≤ 2I, i.e. L increases with I at most linearly.
13For an exact definition of F ∗ see the appendix. The argument, however, can be made
without specifying F ∗.
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standardization we need more and more mutants if I becomes large. What this
informal argument shows is that we need a much smaller number of mistakes to
go from standardization to individualization than we need in the reverse transi-
tion, if the economy is large. Hence, trade on both markets with traders splitting
equally between the markets is the unique stochastically stable state if I is large.
Theorem 3.4 is an important result. It shows that for all 0 < c < K and
I sufficiently large there is a unique stochastically state which is given by the
convention with trade on both markets.14 Hence, recalling the result from section
2.3, in a large economy the evolutionary process selects the welfare maximizing
market structure. By way of contrast we have seen that the indeterminacy of
Nash equilibria is robust against an increase in the number of traders. The result
holds because for I sufficiently large, the number of mistakes necessary to trigger
a transition from standardization to individualization is bounded, while we need
infinitely many mistakes to trigger a transition in the reverse direction. This also
implies that we can expect convergence to the market structure with trade on
both markets to be reasonably fast.15 The following theorem provides a bound
on the expected waiting time until the process reaches the stochastically stable
convention. It shows that in our model the evolutionary forces will already be
effective in the medium run.
Theorem 3.5 Let W (h, ε) be the expected number of periods until the convention
h3 is first reached given that the process P ε starts in h. Then, there exists an
I0 = I0(c,K) such that for I ≥ I0 and any h )= h3,
W (h, ε) = O
(
ε−n(c+K)/c
)
as ε→ 0.
We see that the bound on the expected waiting time is independent of the num-
ber of traders. In this sense, evolution in our model can be considered as fast
(cf. Ellison, 2000).
Finally, we analyze how the stability of the different conventions is influenced
14Recall that we assumed c < K(I − 1)/I and limI→∞K(I − 1)/I = K.
15Some authors (Ellison, 1993, Binmore et al., 1995, among others), have argued that the
equilibrium selection theories in Kandori et al. (1993) or Young (1993) do not deliver reasonable
predictions since they only characterize behavior in the “ultra-long run.”
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by the traders’ risk aversion and by the risk present in the economy, namely by
the idiosyncratic endowment risk and by the aggregate dividend risk.
Theorem 3.6 Let I > 4n and n ≤ m/(L + 2). Then the thresholds c∗1 and c∗2
are non-decreasing in the coefficient of risk aversion γ and in the variances of
dividends σ2 and of endowments σ2e .
This result is intuitive given our observations concerning an increase in the num-
ber of traders. Here, we just get the opposite effect: If traders become more risk
averse or if the variances of dividends or endowments increase, then liquidity con-
siderations become more important relative to idiosyncratic preferences and the
range of costs for which standardization is stochastically stable becomes larger.
4 Conclusion
We have studied the choice of markets in the presence of trading frictions and
liquidity effects. While the static model has multiple Nash equilibria including a
no trade equilibrium, the evolutionary process selects a unique equilibrium for a
large range of costs: For sufficiently low costs, all agents will meet on one market
(most of the time), while for sufficiently high costs, there will be trade on both
markets (most of the time). Hence, we observe standardization (e.g. of maturity
dates or trading platforms) if and only if liquidity considerations are relatively
more important than idiosyncratic preferences for the two markets. Different
from the static model, the interval of costs, for which standardization as well
as trade on both markets (individualization) are stochastically stable, vanishes
if the number of traders becomes large. Moreover, our analysis suggests that in
economies with a large number of traders we will observe individualization rather
than standardization, which is also the welfare maximizing market structure.
While evolutionary models are often subject to the criticism that the evolutionary
forces are only effective in the ultra-long run, here we are able to show that the
convergence to the stochastically stable market structure is reasonably fast.
Further research in this area could follow several routes. One could consider
economies where there are more than two markets or where the location of the
20
markets is chosen endogenously. One may also want to introduce market makers
who operate the markets and collect fees for their services. This would add
another strategic element to our model and clearly is beyond the scope of the
present paper.
A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2.1: s∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if s∗ satisfies
|Tk(s∗)|− 1
|Tk(s∗)| K ≥ c
i(k) ∀ i ∈ Tk(s∗), k = 1, 2, (2)
( |Tk(s∗)|− 1
|Tk(s∗)| −
|Tl(s∗)|
|Tl(s∗)| + 1
)
K ≥ ci(k)− ci(l) ∀ i ∈ Tk(s∗), l )= k, k = 1, 2,(3)
|Tk(s∗)|
|Tk(s∗)| + 1K ≤ c
i(k) ∀ i )∈ T1(s∗) ∪ T2(s∗), k = 1, 2. (4)
It is immediate to see that s∗0, s∗1 and s∗2 are always Nash equilibria, and that
s∗1 and s∗2 are strict, while s∗0 is not strict. The full characterization of the set
of Nash equilibria then follows from the following series of lemmata.
Lemma A.1 If s∗ is a Nash equilibrium of Γ, then there exist I∗1 , I
∗
2 , with
I∗1 , I
∗
2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I + 1} and I∗1 < I∗2 , such that
s∗i =

1 , if i ≤ I∗1
2 , if i ≥ I∗2
0 , if I∗1 < i < I
∗
2
. (5)
Proof of Lemma A.1: Let s∗ be a Nash equilibrium. If T1(s∗) = ∅ let
I∗1 = 0. Otherwise, let I
∗
1 be the maximal i such that i ∈ T1(s∗) and let 1 ≤ j < i.
If j /∈ T1(s∗) ∪ T2(s∗), then from (4) it follows that
|T1(s∗)|
|T1(s∗)| + 1K ≤ c
j(1) < ci(1),
which is a contradiction since player i’s participation constraint (2) is violated.
Now assume that j ∈ T2(s∗). Then from (3) it follows that( |T2(s∗)|− 1
|T2(s∗)| −
|T1(s∗)|
|T1(s∗)| + 1
)
K ≥ cj(2)− cj(1). (6)
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Since i ∈ T1(s∗) from (3) it follows that( |T1(s∗)|− 1
|T1(s∗)| −
|T2(s∗)|
|T2(s∗)| + 1
)
K ≥ ci(1)− ci(2). (7)
Since cj(2)− cj(1) > ci(2)− ci(1) from (6) and (7) we conclude that
|T2(s∗)|− 1
|T2(s∗)| −
|T1(s∗)|
|T1(s∗)| + 1 >
|T2(s∗)|
|T2(s∗)| + 1 −
|T1(s∗)|− 1
|T1(s∗)|
which is impossible. Hence, j ∈ T1(s∗) and we have proved that s∗i = 1 if and
only if 1 ≤ i ≤ I∗1 . The proof that there exists I∗2 , I∗1 < I∗2 ≤ I + 1 such that
s∗i = 2 if and only if i ≥ I∗2 is similar.
♦
In the following we will say that (I∗1 , I
∗
2 ) is a Nash equilibrium if s
∗ as defined in
(5) is a Nash equilibrium for Γ.
Lemma A.2 There exists no Nash equilibrium (I∗1 , I
∗
2 ) such that I
∗
1 +1 < I
∗
2 and
such that either I∗1 ≥ 1 or I∗2 ≤ I.
Proof of Lemma A.2: Let I1 + 1 < I2 with I1 ≥ 1 or I2 ≤ I. We will
prove that (I1, I2) is not a Nash equilibrium. To this end we only consider the
case where I1 ≥ 1. An analogous argument applies for the case I2 ≤ I. Since
c < K(I − 1)/I, it follows that K(i − 1)/i > c(i − 1)/(I − 1) for all 2 ≤ i ≤ I.
This is true in particular for i = I1+1. Hence staying at home is not a best reply
for i = I1 +1, i.e. condition (4) is violated and (I1, I2) is not a Nash equilibrium.
♦
Lemma A.3 Let 1 ≤ I∗1 ≤ I − 1 and I∗2 = I1 + 1. Then (I∗1 , I∗2 ) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if I∗1 = I/2 and c ≥
4K(I − 1)
I(I + 2)
.
Proof of Lemma A.3: Let (I1, I2) be a Nash equilibrium with 1 ≤ I1 ≤
I − 1, I2 = I1 + 1. If we apply the equilibrium conditions (2)-(4) to i = I1 we
obtain that
2I1 − I − 1
I1(I − I1 + 1)K ≥
2I1 − I − 1
I − 1 c. (8)
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Similarly, for i = I2 = I1 + 1 we obtain that
I − 2I1 − 1
(I − I1)(I1 + 1)K ≥
I − 2I1 − 1
I − 1 c. (9)
If I1 < (I − 1)/2, then (8) is equivalent to
c
I − 1 ≥
K
I1(I − I1 + 1) , (10)
and (9) is equivalent to
c
I − 1 ≤
K
(I − I1)(I1 + 1) . (11)
From (10) and (11) it follows that I1 ≥ I/2 which is a contradiction. In the same
way we obtain a contradiction in the case I1 > (I + 1)/2. Hence, a necessary
condition for (I1, I1 + 1) to be a Nash equilibrium is that I1 = I/2. If I1 = I/2,
then (8) or (9) imply that c ≥ 4K(I − 1)/(I(I + 2)). It is immediate to see that
(I/2, I/2 + 1) is indeed a Nash equilibrium if c ≥ 4K(I − 1)/(I(I + 2)).
♦
Hence, s∗3 is a Nash equilibrium if and only if c ≥ 4K(I − 1)/(I(I +2)). The
Nash equilibrium is strict if and only if the inequality is strict. This concludes
the proof of the theorem.
"
Proof of Theorem 3.1: As Young (1993, Theorem 1) has shown, for a
weakly acyclic game adaptive play converges almost surely to a convention if
n ≤ m/(L + 2), where L = maxs L(s) and L(s) is the shortest directed path in
the best reply graph from s to a strict Nash equilibrium. We cannot directly
apply this theorem in our context since our best reply dynamic is different (see
the discussion following the definition of a best reply to a sample). However,
an inspection of the proof in Young (1993) reveals that he only uses arguments
where agents play a best reply to a sample with identical strategy profiles, in
which case the different notions of best replies to a sample obviously coincide.
Hence, we can use the same proof to show an analogue of Young’s theorem for
our best reply dynamic. It remains to prove that our game Γ is weakly acyclic.
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To this end, let s∗ be an arbitrary strategy profile. First consider the case, where
s∗ = s¯F for some 0 ≤ F ≤ I, and s¯F is defined by
s¯Fi =
{
1 , i ≤ F
2 , i ≥ F + 1 . (12)
Without loss of generality let F ≤ I/2.
Case 1: c )= 4K(I − 1)
I(I + 2)
Then all Nash equilibria except for the no trade equilibrium are strict. In particu-
lar, if s¯F is a Nash equilibrium then it is strict. Hence, if s¯F is a Nash equilibrium
we are done. Otherwise, s¯Fi is not the best reply to s¯
F
−i for i = F or i = F +1. If
s¯Fi = 1 is not the best reply to s¯
F
−i for i = F , then si = 2 is a best reply (observe
that si = 0 cannot be the unique best reply for i = F ). Hence, s¯F → s¯F−1 in the
best reply graph. Since by construction s¯F−1i is a best reply to s¯
F−1
−i for i = F ,
it follows that either s¯F−1 is a (strict) Nash equilibrium or s¯F−1i is not a best
reply to s¯F−1−i for i = F − 1. In the latter case s¯F−1 → s¯F−2. Proceeding in this
manner, after a finite number of steps we reach s¯0 = s∗2 which is a strict Nash
equilibrium. If s¯Fi is not a best reply to s¯
F
−i for i = F +1, then a similar argument
shows that after a finite number of steps we either reach s¯I/2 = s∗3 and stop, if
the latter is a strict Nash equilibrium. Or otherwise we reach s¯I = s∗1, which
always is a strict Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: c =
4K(I − 1)
I(I + 2)
Then s∗1 and s∗2 are the unique strict Nash equilibria. Hence, if F = 0 we are
done. If 1 ≤ F ≤ I/2, then s¯Fi is not the unique best reply to s¯F−i for i = F since
K
(
I − F
I − F + 1 −
F − 1
F
)
≥ c
I − 1(I − 2F + 1)
⇐⇒ F 2 − F (I + 1) + I(I + 2)
4
≥ 0,
which is fulfilled for all 1 ≤ F ≤ I/2. Hence s¯F → s¯F−1 and either F − 1 = 0
and we are done or by the same argument as above s¯F−1 → s¯F−2. Again, after a
finite number of steps we reach the strict Nash equilibrium s¯0 = s∗2.
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Now let s∗ be an arbitrary strategy profile. If s∗ is a strict Nash equilibrium
we are done. Otherwise, we construct a path from s∗ to some s¯F in the best
reply graph by defining s0, s1, . . . , sI , as follows: s0 = s∗ and sk = (sk, sk−1−k ) for
k = 1, . . . , I, where sk is a best reply of k to s
k−1
−k and sk = 0 only if 0 is the unique
best reply. By construction, skk )= 0 for all k since c < K(I − 1)/I. Let k ≥ 1 be
minimal such that skk = 2, i.e. s
l
l = 1 for all l < k. Then it is straightforward to
see that sll = 2 for all l = k + 1, . . . , I. Hence s
I = s¯k−1 and we are done by the
first part of the proof.
"
Proof of Lemma 3.2: Let G be the graph with vertices {hk}, k = 1, 2, 3, and
directed edges ({hk}, {hl}) with weight rkl = min(h1,...,hτ ) r(h1, h2) + r(h2, h3) +
. . .+ r(hτ−1, hτ ), where the minimum is taken over all directed paths (h1, . . . , hτ )
with h1 = hk and hτ = hl. By symmetry, r13 = r23 = r∗, r31 = r32 = r˜ and
r12 = r21 =: r. Define a tree rooted at vertex {hk} to be a spanning tree in G
such that from every vertex {hl} different from {hk} there is a unique directed
path from {hl} to {hk}.16 The resistance of a rooted tree is defined to be the sum
of the resistances on the edges that compose it. Finally, the stochastic potential γk
of the recurrent communication class {hk} is defined to be the minimum resistance
over all trees rooted at {hk}.
As Young (1993, Theorem 2, resp. Theorem 4 in the appendix) has shown,
the stochastically stable states of adaptive play P ε are the states contained in
the recurrent communication classes of P 0 with minimum stochastic potential.
By Theorem 3.1 the recurrent communication classes of the process P 0 are sin-
gletons and contain the conventions as their unique element. Hence, it remains
to determine the stochastic potential of each class {hk}, k = 1, 2, 3. Since it is
obviously true that r ≥ max{r∗, r˜}, we find that γ1 = γ2 = r∗ + r˜ and γ3 = 2r∗,
which immediately implies the claim of the lemma.
"
Proof of Theorem 3.3: By Lemma 3.2, h1 and h2 are the unique stochas-
tically stable states for c ≤ 4K(I − 1)/(I(I + 2)), since in this case r˜ = 0 < r∗.
16This notion of a rooted tree is due to Freidlin and Wentzell (1984).
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Hence, it remains to consider the case c > 4K(I−1)/(I(I +2)), for which s∗1, s∗2
and s∗3 are all strict Nash equilibria. For 0 ≤ F ≤ I let s¯F ∈ ∏i∈I Si be defined
as in (12) and let F ∗ be the minimal F ≥ 1 such that si = 1 is a best reply to
s¯F−i for i = F . Obviously, F
∗ ≤ I/2 and F ∗ is the minimal F ≥ 1 such that
K
F − 1
F
− F − 1
I − 1 c ≥ K
I − F
I − F + 1 −
I − F
I − 1 c.
Hence,
F ∗ =
 I + 12 −
√(
I + 1
2
)2
− K(I − 1)
c
 .17 (13)
Similarly, let F˜ be the minimal F ≥ 1 such that si = 1 is a best reply to
sI/2+F−i for i = I/2 + F . We obtain
F˜ =
12 +
√(
I + 1
2
)2
− K(I − 1)
c
 , (14)
and observe that F ∗, F˜ ≥ 2. Assume now that the economy is in state h2. Any
path from h2 to h3 has to reach a state h with the following property (P):
If s is one of the n right-most elements of h, then there exists F =
F (s), F ∗ ≤ F ≤ I/2, such that si = 1 for all i ≤ F and si = 2 for all
i ≥ I/2 + 1.18
We will show that there exists a path of zero resistance from h to h3. To
this end, let (s1, . . . , sn) be the sample of the last n observations in h and let
F l = F (sl) as defined in property (P). Let si be a best reply of i to this sample.
Then si = 2 for all i ≥ I/2 + 1 (otherwise going to market 1 would also be a
best reply to s∗3−i). Moreover, by definition of F
∗ it follows that si = 1 for all
i ≤ minl F l + 1 whenever minl F l < I/2. Hence, if F ∗ = I/2 we are done since
h = h3. If F ∗ < I/2, let h0 = h and for all l ≥ 1 let hl be the successor of hl−1,
such that if sl is the last element of hl, then for all i, sli is a best reply of i to
the last n observations in hl−1. Given our observation above we see that for all
l, sli = 2 for all i ≥ I/2 + 1 and sli = 1 for all i ≤ F ∗ + 1. If F ∗ + 1 = I/2,
17By 0x1 we denote the smallest integer larger or equal to x ∈ R.
18For example, h3 itself has this property.
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then sl = s∗3 for all l ≥ 1 and therefore hm = h3 and we are done. Otherwise,
F ∗ + 1 < I/2, and we apply the same reasoning as before. Hence, there exists
N ≥ 1 such that hN = h3, i.e. there is a path of zero resistance from h to h3.
This implies, that the minimum resistance over all paths from h2 to h3, r∗,
can be characterized as the minimum total number of mistakes such that, start-
ing from h2 the adaptive play process reaches a state h having property (P).
Therefore, r∗ is non-decreasing in F ∗. We will now construct such a path and
determine its resistance, which will give an upper bound on r∗. Starting from
h2 let the players i = 1, . . . , F ∗, choose si = 1 n times in succession (either as
a best reply or by mistake) and let any i > F ∗ sample from the last n obser-
vations in any history and play a best reply. In this way we obtain a path of
histories h0, h1 . . . , hn, with h0 = h2 and such that for the last element sl of hl
(l = 1, . . . , n) it is true that sli = 1 for all i ≤ F ∗ and sli is a best reply to the
last n observations in hl−1 for all i ≥ F ∗ +1. Then sli = 2 for all i ≥ I/2+ 1 and
all l = 1, . . . , n. Hence, hn has property (P), which is what we wanted to show.
The resistance of the path from h2 to hn, and hence from h2 to h3, is less than or
equal to nF ∗. Since, starting from h2, one obviously needs at least F ∗ mistakes
for h3 to be reached, we conclude that
F ∗ ≤ r∗ ≤ nF ∗. (15)
In a similar way we obtain that r˜ is non-decreasing in F˜ and
F˜ ≤ r˜ ≤ nF˜ . (16)
Let I > 4n. Since F ∗ is non-increasing in c and r∗ is non-decreasing in F ∗
it follows that r∗ is non-increasing in c. Similarly, since F˜ is non-decreasing in c
and r˜ is non-decreasing in F˜ it follows that r˜ is non-decreasing in c. If c is close
to K(I − 1)/I, then F ∗ = 2 and F˜ = I/2. Hence, from (15) and (16) it follows
that r∗ ≤ 2n and r˜ ≥ I/2. Since I > 4n we conclude that r˜ > r∗. On the other
hand, if c is close to 4K(I − 1)/(I(I + 2)), then F ∗ = I/2 and F˜ = 2. In this
case from (15) and (16) it follows that r∗ ≥ I/2 and r˜ ≤ 2n and, since I > 4n,
we get that r∗ > r˜. Thus, given the monotonicity property of r∗ and r˜ we obtain
the existence of some c∗1, c
∗
2 ∈
(
4K(I − 1)/(I(I + 2)), K(I − 1)/I
)
, c∗1 ≤ c∗2, such
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that r˜ < r∗ for c < c∗1, r˜ > r
∗ for c > c∗2 and r˜ = r
∗ for all c ∈ (c∗1, c∗2) in case
c∗1 < c
∗
2. This proves the theorem.
"
Proof of Theorem 3.4: We fix the sample size n. In the following we write
F ∗, F˜ , r∗ and r˜ as functions of I. By the definition of F ∗ in (13) it follows that
F ∗(I) ≤ I + 3
2
−
√(
I + 1
2
)2
− K(I − 1)
c
=: g(I).
If (c+K)/c is not an integer, let δ > 0 be such that 0(c + K)/c1 > (c+K)/c+ δ.
Otherwise, if (c + K)/c is an integer, let 0 < δ < 1 be arbitrary. We will show
that there exists I0 = I0(c,K) such that
g(I) ≤ c + K
c
+ δ for all I ≥ I0. (17)
For I sufficiently large (17) is equivalent to
δI ≥
(
c + K
c
+ δ
)2
− 3
(
c + K
c
+ δ
)
+ 2− K
c
, (18)
which follows from a straightforward computation. Clearly, there exists I0 =
I0(c,K) such that (18) and hence (17) is satisfied for all I ≥ I0. By the choice of
δ this proves that F ∗(I) ≤ (c + K)/c, since F ∗(I) is an integer. Hence, by (15)
it follows that r∗(I) ≤ n(c + K)/c for I ≥ I0.
By (16), in order to prove that limI→∞ r˜(I) = ∞ it suffices to show that
limI→∞ F˜ (I) =∞. By the definition of F˜ in (14) it follows that
F˜ (I) ≥ −1
2
+
√(
I + 1
2
)2
− K(I − 1)
c
(19)
and it is immediately seen that the right hand side of this inequality goes to
infinity for I →∞. This proves the first part of the theorem.
Hence, for all 0 < c < K there exists I(c) such that r˜(I) > r∗(I) for all
I ≥ I(c). By Theorem 3.3 this implies c ≥ c∗2(I) for all I ≥ I(c). Since c was
arbitrary it follows that limI→∞ c∗2(I) = 0 and therefore
lim
I→∞
c∗1(I) = lim
I→∞
c∗2(I) = 0.
"
28
Proof of Theorem 3.5: By Ellison (2000, Lemma 6), W (h, ε) = O(ε−CR),
where CR is the coradius of the basin of attraction of the recurrent class {h3}.
CR is defined by CR = maxh&=h3 min(h1,...,ht) r(h
1, h2)+r(h2, h3)+. . .+r(ht−1, ht),
where the minimum is taken over all paths (h1, . . . , ht) with h1 = h, ht = h3 and
hτ )= hτ ′ for all τ, τ ′ ∈ {1, . . . , t}, τ )= τ ′. Hence, CR = r∗ and the claim follows
from Theorem 3.4.
"
Proof of Theorem 3.6: Since F ∗ is non-decreasing and F˜ is non-increasing
in K it follows that r∗ is non-decreasing and r˜ is non-increasing in K for fixed
cost c. Hence, the endpoints of the interval (c∗1, c
∗
2) on which the graphs of r
∗ and
r˜ intersect are non-decreasing in K. The claim then immediately follows if we
recall that K = γσ2σ2e/2.
"
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